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ABSTRACT 
laproved performance in emergency management by the use of modern 
information technology has been investigated. Limited parts of a 
preparedness system have been chosen based on analysis of drills 
with respect to emergency situations and real accidents. Specific 
functions relevant for the situation have been selected and 
implemented in prototype test systems. Finally, the usefulness of 
the prototype systems has been evaluated by experiments following 
specific scenarios. 
Descriptors - INIS: 
Decision Making; Education; Emergency Plans; Evaluation; 
Information Systems; Han-Machine Systems; Management; 
Organisational Models; Personnel; Testing. 
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SUMMARY 
Increasing complexity of industrial processes in combination with 
recognition of errors that have occurred in handling emergency 
situations call for improved support for those who have to make 
decisions when accidents are developing. 
The functionality and efficiency of emergency management is 
likely to be improved if advanced information technology is 
available. This has been investigated in a limited part of an 
emergency preparedness system. The investigation was done in a 
nuclear industry context, but attention has been paid to the 
similarities between different types of emergency situations, 
especially concerning the situation off-site, i.e. in the 
environment of a plant. 
To be useful in an emergency situation, the tools given to the 
persons involved in an emergency preparedness organisation must 
not only be effective for the emergency management, they must 
also be self-explanatory and simple to use. Experience with such 
tools should be obtained from realistic drills, as it is of 
utmost importance that the users are familiar with the tools 
before they need them in an actual situation. It is unlikely that 
a person will experience a real emergency situation more than 
once in his/her entire lifetime, if any at all. 
In this project, detailed analysis of accident and emergency 
scenarios was based on records from drills in nuclear 
installations. This analysis has revealed the complexity that 
must be faced in making emergency management organisations work 
properly. Efficient decision making and exchange of information 
in situations with high stress and work load are important for 
the proper functioning of emergency organisations. Consequently, 
to demonstrate the possible benefits of moaern information 
technology for emergency management, functions that can improve 
the reliability of information exchange would be helpful. 
For this purpose a few but important functions have been studied 
and tested under realistic circumstances. The functions include 
- information handling, 
- information transfer, 
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- reminder functions. 
Using these functions, 'hose responsible for the emergency 
management will be able to categorise and file messages in a way 
which makes the messages easy to access at a later time. Messages 
can also be formulated and received in a standardised manner to 
ensure that nothing is forgotten. Furthermore, reminder functions 
are partly built upon the emergency preparedness guide/plan, and 
partly developed to be used according to individual wishes of the 
user. Thus, selectee messages can be presented within fixed time 
intervals or at a later preselected time. 
The information related functions have been tested in two 
different emergency systems. The first is an on-site emergency 
management system, based on the actual preparedness organisation 
at the Finnish Nuclear Power Plant Loviisa. The second is the 
off-site emergency management system, based on the emergency 
preparedness organisation in Sweden. 
First a detailed analysis of information flow in these two 
systems in case of an emergency was performed. Three individual 
centres, the County Emergency Organisation Centre (CEOC), the 
Reactor Safety Authority (SKI), and the Radiation Protection 
Authority (SSI), which are geographically separated, are the main 
actors in the off-site system, against only one, the Plant 
Emergency Organisation Centre, in the on-site system. The 
analysis has identified the type of information transferred in 
the main centres. From this analysis, data and knowledge required 
for an effective decision support system could be specified. 
From an analysis of the organisational units involved, two 
specific centres were selected, the Plant Emergency Organisation 
Centre and the County Emergency Organisation Centre for the on-
site and off-site organisations, respectively. They were used as 
test cases for development of an advanced message handling and 
reminder system. The system was analysed in detail with respect 
to the functions to be included, the need for data and knowledge 
bases, as well as the specific features desired. Finally, the 
system was implemented in two prototype systems, one for on-site 
and one for off-site. 
The usefulness of these two prototype systems was then evaluated 
using two different Methods: a conceptual evaluation in which the 
presence of needed functions is verified, and an empirical 
evaluation which is in fact a test of the functions implemented 
in the prototype systems. 
The empirical evaluation involved experiments that were based on 
four different scenarios, two on-site and two off-site. The 
results obtained when using the new emergency support systems 
were compared with control conditions using "normal" information 
procedures in order to evaluate the benefits of the systems. As 
the prototype systems are covering only a part of the emergency 
management, it is important for the evaluation to arrange the 
scenarios to make sure that the implemented functions are in fact 
tried out. 
The success of the information systems was measured by the 
quality of the status reports produced by the persons carrying 
out the experiments and on the extent to which they actually 
carried out the items in the emergency preparedness guide/plan. 
Furthermore, the evaluation considered the satisfaction of the 
persons using the systems. This was unveiled by interviews of 
those persons having performed both in a condition with the 
system and in the more traditional condition. 
Prior to the experiments the test persons were given half an hour 
of introduction to the system and its various facilities. Despite 
the short tine of introduction the test persons seemed to be 
familiar with the possible features of the system during the 
experiments. However, to avoid delay due to trivial problems they 
were provided with an experienced terminal operator to execute 
their orders so that practical man machine interface problems 
would not blur the experiments. 
The test persons used for the evaluation of the systems were 
experts, able to perform optimally in most situations using the 
traditional preparedness system (in total five persons from the 
county authorities in Uppsala were involved in the off-site test 
and four persons from Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in the on-site 
test). Owing to the skill of the test persons an extraordinary 
challenging emergency situation would have been needed to provoke 
errors using the traditional preparedness system and make visible 
the advantage of using the new and advanced system. However, when 
using the fairly simple test scenarios, the outcox of the 
experiments with the new system and the conventional one was 
similar, in both cases ending with the emergency under control. 
So, in defiance of the generally high user satisfaction -
especially in the off-site evaluation - the evaluation of the 
arner gency management did not give any statistically significant 
indication about the advantage of using the computerised system. 
As mentioned, user satisfaction was generally high in the off-
site evaluation. All the test persons found the system useful in 
the experiment and considered it to be useful also in a real 
emergency situation. Test persons in the on-site evaluation were 
mm«what less enthusiastic. It seems as if user satisfaction of 
the system - which was developed for a single person - is 
related to the test persons' normal way of acting: off-site 
persons normally work alone with contact to persons at distant 
destinations, on-site persons normally work in teams with direct 
face-to-face contact. 
Test persons of both categories found the system well suited for 
training purpose in the emergency organisation, and the off-site 
persons - experts from the county authorities in Uppsala -
expressed their interest in having some form of the system 
available, especially for this purpose. 
It appears that support systems can be designed, using advanced 
information technology, that can facilitate decision making in 
emergency situations in complicated process plants. This concept 
is further pursued in a European Community foZlow-up project 
continuing the Nordic work described in this report. 
SAKUUtFATTKIKG 
Syftat aed projektet har varit att förbättra stödet for 
beslutsfattande i haveriorganisationer genom att utveckla och 
pröva användningen av södern informationsteknologi i en begränsad 
del av organisationen. Tillämpningen har varit inriktad på 
kärnkraftsindustrin, sen likheter ned andrs typer av haverier har 
också beaktats, särskilt vad galler haveriv r\jan isat ionen utanför 
anläggningen. 
För att kunna handskas ned en haveri situation är det viktigt att 
de personer SOB finns i haveriorganisationen har de bästa verktyg 
sov står att få. Dessa verktyg skall vara effektiva for arbetet i 
haveriorganisationen och samtidigt vara enkla att använda. 
Erfarenheten av sädana verktyg bor komma från realistiska 
övningar, eftersom det ar av yttersta vikt att personalen kan 
använda verktygen innan de skall utnyttjas i ett verkligt läge. 
Vidare ar det osannolikt att samma person kommer att uppleva mer 
än en haverisituation under sin livstid, oa ens någon. 
Utgångspunkten var en analys av olycks- och haveriscenarier, 
baserad på övningar i karnkraftssammanhang. Resultatet visade att 
den uppgift haveriorganisationer måste klara for att fylla sin 
funktion ar komplex. Effektivt beslutsfattande och inforr .tions-
utbyte i situationer ned hog stress och arbetsbelastr ig fore-
faller vara särskilt viktiga för framgång. Darfor jorde nan 
inrikta sig på just dessa uppgifter nar man vill demonstrera 
nöjliga fordelar med att använda modern informationsteknolog i for 
att förbättra arbetet i en haveriorganisation och undersöka . ras 
effekter i realistiska sammanhang. 
På grundval av denna analys valdes tre viktiga fut. -ioner .tt 
ingå i ett protypsystem, nämligen 
- informationshantering 
- informationsöverföring 
- påminnelsefupktioner 
Hed hjalp av dessa funktioner, kan de som arbetar i haveriorgani-
sationen kategorisera och laqra meddelanden på ett satt som gor 
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det latt att haata fraa dea vid behov. Heddelanden kan sandas och 
tas not pi ett standard i sera t satt soa garanterar att inget 
utelåanas. På* i nne Ise funktionerna bygger på åtgardskalendern for 
haveriorganisationen, aen tillåter också anvandaren att lagga in 
påainnelser oa det han sjalv val jer att bl i påaind oa, ant ingen 
vid ett givet tillfalle eller vid olika tidpunkter. 
Den fortsatte analysen inriktades pi tvi systea æ d oiifca an-
svarsoaråden, aen soa éndi uppvisade betydande ^ikheter: haveri-
organisationen på ett karnkraftverk, aodellerad pi det finska 
kårnkraftverket i Lovisa och haveriorganisationen pi lanstyrelse-
nivå, baserad pa organisationen i Uppsala lån i Sverige. 
I projektets huvudfas geno*fordes en detaljerad scenarioanalys i 
koabination æ d en begreppsanalys av fordelat beslutsfattånde. 
Betydande arbetsinsatser har gjorts for att analysera infor-
aationsflodet i detalj vad galler lånsstyrelsens katastrof-
central, SSI, SKI, och kårnkraftverkets haveriorganisation och 
for att forsoka identifiera vilken inforaation soa overfors 
aellan de viktigaste centra. Pi grundval av denna analys speeifi-
cerades de data och den kunskap soa kravs for att utveckla ett 
effektivt beslutstodssystea. 
Trin analysen av de inblandade organisatoriska enheterna har 
olika testfall valts ut for att utveckla och prova ett avancerat 
aeddelandehanterings- och piainnelsesystea. Systeaet har analy-
serats och specificerats i detalj vad galler vilka funktioner soa 
ska 11 ingi, data- och kunskapsbaser och speciella egenskaper. 
Slut?igen har det impleaenterats i fora av två prototypsyste«, 
ett for haveriorganisationen pi kårnkraftverket och ett for Ians-
styrelsens haveriorganisation. Dessa beskrivs i olika avsnitt i 
rapporten. 
I slutfasen har prototypsysteaen utvarderats med två olika 
metoder: en begreppslig utvardering enligt de principer som fo-
reslagits av Rouse och en empirisk utvardering som uzqor en 
provning av de funktioner som implementerats i protypsystemen. 
I den empiriska utvarderingen av prototypsystemen genomfordes 
experiment baserade pi fyra olika scenarier, två for organisa-
tionen pi verket och två for lansstyrelseorganisationen. Presta-
tionen i dessa scenarier med protypsystemet jamfordes med presta-
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tionen utan dessa sy s t—. O* fyra scenarierna konstruerades M d 
hänsyntagen till att prototypsystemen enbart oafåttar an 
begränsad dal av havariorganisationen. 
Fora själva experimentet fick försökspersonerna an introduktion 
till de olika Böjligheter systemen erbjöd och an demonstration av 
hur dessa kunde användas. Denna introduktion tog ungefär en halv-
timme. Trots den korta tiden föreföll personerna insatta i 
systemens möjligheter under själva experimenten. För att undvika 
fördröjningar beroende på triviala problem ned själva hend-
havandet av systemen hade de dock hjälp av en erfaren operatör 
som skötte systemen under experimenten i enlighet med de anvis-
ningar som gavs från försökspersonerna. 
Experimenten ger information för en empirisk utvärdering av den 
kombinerade effekten av implementationsstrategin, den begrepps-
liga modellen som ligger bakom de system som utvecklats och de 
data- och kunskapsbaser som använts. 
Utvärderingen har baserats på kvaliteten i de lägesrapporter som 
producerats av försökspersonerna i experimenten och på i vilken 
utsträckning de faktiskt utfört de olika moment som finns i de 
relevanta åtgärdskalendrarna. Vidare har utvärderingen gruidats 
på data som belyser användarnas inställning till systemet, inhäm-
tade från intervjuer efter det att försökspersonerna gått igenom 
ett scenario med och ett scenario utan systemet. 
Utvärderingen av försökspersonernas prestation (fyra personer 
från Lovisaverket i utvärderingen av systemet i verkets organi-
sation och fem personer från länsstyrelsen i Uppsala i utvärde-
ringen av systemet i länsstyrelseorg*nisationen) avslöjade inga 
skillnader mellan betingelsen med systemet och betingelsen utan 
systemet. Detta berodde på den höga prestationen i kontrollbe-
tingelsen, och både i denna betingelse och i betingelsen med 
systemet kunde försökspersonerna få haverisituationen under kon-
troll på ungefär samma tid. Detta resultat är inte förvinande i 
ljuset av erfarenheterna från andra försök att utvärdera informa-
tions- och beslutsstödssystem, och diskuteras i rapporten. 
Användartillfredsställelsen var i allmänhet hög i den utvärdering 
som gällde länsstyrelseorganisationen. Samtliga försökspersoner 
fann systemet användbart i experimentet, och ansåg att det också 
skull* kunna vara till nytta i en verklig haveriorganisation. 
Försökspersonerna i den utvärdering SOB galIde systemet for kärn-
kraftverket var dock mindre entusiastiska. Skillnaderna i till-
fredsställelse torde ha att göra sed olikheter i det normala 
arbetssättet i de två organisationerna. I organisationen på 
verket kommunicerar områdesledaren huvudsakligen direkt med andra 
personer i staben, medan kommunikationen vad galler lansstyrelse-
organisationen i större utsträckning galler personer och organi-
sationer utanför den egna staben. 
Försökspersonerna i båda utvärderingarna var emellertid ?nse on 
att systemet var val agnat for att trana befattningshavare i 
haveriorganisationen, och försökspersonerna från lansstyrelsen i 
Uppsala uttryckte intresse av att få tillgång till någon fors av 
systemet for just detta andamål. 
Projektet har visat att modern informationsteknologi kan bidra 
till stod for beslutsfattande i havariorganisationer i komplice-
rade processanläggningar. Problemställningen i det nordiska 
arbetet behandlas nu vidare i ett europeiskt projekt som skall 
avslutas med en demonstration i full skala. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accidental situations are not unknown to people working in the 
present industrialised world. In most situations a failure which 
is not unfamiliar to the plant operators will show up, a limited 
number of people will be involved, hopefully - and normally -
nobody will be harmed. Afte- a couple of suitable procedures have 
been carried out, the situation will be und r control. Some 
comments about the event including a moderate analysis have to be 
entered into the logbook, and the daily routine will continue as 
normal. 
However, experience has shown that in -ecent years the rate of 
major industrial accidents, some of which have evolved into 
serious emergency situations, has increased drastically. In fact, 
the twentieth century has brought about a rapid rise in the rate 
of major industrial accidents and deaths of which half of the 
most serious have occurred since 1977 (Shrivastava 1987) . As we 
approach the end of the century, we will see the proliferation of 
new and complex technologies in the industrialised world. At the 
same time, an increasing amount of hazardous technologies will be 
introduced in the developing countries, where industrial 
accidents are more common because the developing countries often 
lack an adequate industrial infrastructure. As a consequence, 
industrial accidents and emergencies are likely to become more 
frequent and larger in scope. However, even in the industrialised 
world the risk of severe accidents will increase as industries 
develop towards larger centralised production units. The 
consequence of this is an increased risk of heavy impact on the 
environments of the plants. This has led to the creation of large 
organisations prepared for accident and emergency management. 
Experience gained from previous incidents and emergency drills 
has revealed the complexity that must be faced in making such 
organisations work properly. A well-functioning preparedness 
system puts heavy demands on communication, the accessibility of 
knowledge, availability of competence, and decision making. 
Furthermore, there must be enough flexibility for shifting 
between fixed rules and for developing new ways of coping with 
unforeseen situations. This is due to a number of problems which 
may arise in large and perhaps geographically separated 
organisations involved in emergency management. People with 
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different backgrounds and responsibilities must co-operate 
smoothly in situations when the time factor is decisive for 
making the correct decisions. For example, in the Three Mile 
Island accident in 1979 more than 30 persons were gathered in the 
control room of the nuclear power plant trying to figure out what 
had happened and what should be done. 
Problems observed within emergency preparedness organisations 
during drills or by analysis of accidental situations - e.g. in 
nuclear power plants - are omissions, confusion, and misunder-
standings. Especially in the minutes just after the occurrence of 
an accident, operators may make the accident worse by taking 
precipitate action under the stress of the emergency. This 
happened at Three Mile Island (Milne 1987). Therefore, rapid 
communication of relevant information has been seen as an issue 
of special importance to be improved. 
In addition, experience has shown that emergency situations that 
were previously expected to be of a local nature are now crossing 
national borders having influence several hundreds of kilometres 
from the source (Chernobyl and chemical accidents along the Rhine 
are examples of this). On this background it seems rational to 
introduce joint international efforts in order to develop systems 
capable of assisting the persons who are responsible in emergency 
management. In accordance with this the joint Nordic programme 
("NKA/INF: Information Technology for Accident and Emergency 
Management") was started in 1985 with the purpose of evaluating 
how modern information technology can contribute to proper 
functioning of a preparedness system that will respond to 
disssters in complex technical plants. The aim has been to 
elaborate a prototype system for a limited part of a 
preparedness system and to test and, possibly, improve the 
functionality and efficiency of accident and emergency 
management. This was to be done by verifying, demonstrating, and 
validating the possible use of advanced information technology in 
the organisations responsible for emergency management. 
Experience gained from this exercise should reveal which parts of 
modern information technology could be useful in coping with 
emergency situations and which parts would be less beneficial 
from the points of view of efficiency in emergency situations, 
flexibility and quality in training, and last but not least, 
assurance of easy and up-to-date maintenance of a computer-
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assisted emergency management system. 
There are many different roles that a computer system for 
emergency management could attend to. These could range from a 
simple system presenting raw data and making data communication 
possible to a very sophisticated system using a vast amount of 
features to elaborate on these data for presentation on a much 
higher le^el of abstraction and formulating possible argued 
solutions to problems. Systems could even be developed to perform 
specific procedures automatically. 
In the INF project we want the human being to make the decisions 
based on detailed and structured information given by the system. 
It is definitely not intended to leave decision making to an 
automated decision system. This will require sufficient skill to 
foresee every kind of situation that might come up, contradicting 
one of the demands we have put on the system that the staff 
should be able to act in unforeseen and unfamiliar situations. 
The original goal of the project was to investigate the benefit 
of using modern information technology in emergency management 
based on needs in the nuclear industry, but developed in a way 
which makes the results directly usable in other hazardous 
industries, for instance in the chemical industry and in th . off-
shore sector. 
Following the Chernobyl accident in 1986 it was decided to focus 
more directly on the nuclear industry. Emergency situations in 
the nuclear industry have obvious similarities with those tho -
arise in other types of industries. 
The following list attempts to summarise some of the ver> -renr .1 
similarities: 
- the systems are complex, 
- several different organisations are involved, 
- efficient communication is needed for managing the emergen-
cies, 
- the emergencies evolve in real time. 
Strong similarities exist especially between the off-site situa-
tion of nuclear and chemical industries. In both a fairly large 
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amount of energy and chemicals is stored in the plants, and 
during the emergency their effect may be spread and have conse-
quences outside the plant itself. This means that the results of 
the INF project will be usable also in the chemical industry, 
especially as off-site emergency is concerned. 
In emergency situations the staff in charge is acting in an 
unfamiliar and stressful situation. Nevertheless, it will have to 
face decisions that 
- must be taken relatively fast, 
- involve complex judgements, 
- involve making trade-offs between partly incompatible demands, 
- must be based on technical data to which it is difficult to 
get access, 
- involve many decision makers and experts. 
In order to evaluate the potential ust of modern information 
technology to assist in such situations, prototype systems 
covering limited parts of an accident and emergency situation 
have been developed. These systems were to make use of 
computerised systems incorv rating communication systems, data 
base and knowledge base technology, and applications of methods 
used in artificial intelligence. 
In the project the on-site and off-site situations, respectively, 
have been treated separately with the on-site system based on the 
preparedness organisation at the Finnish Nuclear Power Plant, 
Loviisa, and the off-site situation based on the Swedish 
preparedness organisation. Yet, with the exception of specific 
adjustments, a vast amount of features are common for tho two 
situations, giving mutual benefit in developing the systems. The 
national affiliations mentioned may result in the use of specific 
terms in the developed systems, related to these organisations. 
The end product of the project has been recommendations for the 
introduction of advanced information technology in emergency 
organisations based on evaluation and validation of the prototype 
systems. 
Already prior to the formal termination of the Nordic programme 
it was agreed to continue along the lines laid down in the 
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programme to develop a complete decision support system for 
distributed decision Baking in emergency management. This 
programme was approved by the Commission of the European 
Communities (CEC), and has been officially started within the 
framework of ESPRIT 2 as "Project Number 2322: IT Support for 
Emergency Management - ISEN" with a commencement date of 1 
January 1989. Especially in the starting phase this project has 
benefited substantially from the Nordic project. 
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2. PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES 
Emergency management involves countless decisions, and these 
decisions require information. Thus, emergency management it;, 
among many other things, an information management problem. As 
part of the NKA project, the information flows and decision 
making in .rn-site and off-site emergency management were analysed 
in drills concerned with nuclear power accidents. This led to the 
identification of a number of problems, which the information 
system should help alleviate, if not solve. 
2.1 Basic functions and responsibilities in emergency 
management 
There are two primary tasks in a nuclear power emergency: the 
accident management task and the emergency management task. 
The primary goal of the first task is to control the behaviour of 
the plant, i.e., in practice to shut down the plant in a safe 
way. NUREG/CR - 4177 defines accident management in the following 
way: 
Accident management is that set of actions taken by the plant 
operating crew to gain control of the outcome of an abnormal 
event at the earliest possible time and with the minimum adverse 
consequences. It is characterised by three component parts 
distinguishable in time: preparedness phase, response phase and 
recovery phase. 
There is no corresponding official definition of the goal of the 
second task, emergency management, but analysis of the relevant 
documents governing the work of the county authorities suggests 
that this task has two principal components: to decide on 
protective measures, such as road blocks and evacuation, and to 
inform the public and other organisations so that the appropriate 
protective action can be taken. 
Figure 2.1 shows the principal organisations involved in the 
emergency management task. It is important to note that the 
various EOCs have very similar functions. Thus, each EOC has a 
status department or some other unit for handling the continuous 
7 
updating of the information about the situation. They have an 
expert or analysis department charged with the evaluation of the 
situation, and an information department for the task of in-
forming the mass media and the public. An operational department, 
or some equivalent is also found for those organisations that 
need such a department. 
The figure also shows the basic types of communication exchanged 
between various agencies, with an emphasis on the CEOC. 
2.2 Problems observed in an emergency organisation 
Analysis of results from drills suggest that omissions, confusion 
and misunderstanding are a common source of problems in the 
emergency organisation (Andersson <• Ho lms trom, 1987). The 
problems ca.i lie divided into four different categories. 
The first has to do with the technical nature of the communi-
cation system (overload of channels, problems in operation). This 
may lead to delays in information transfer. 
The second category of problems has to do with problems in 
ascertaining the correct ord_r of events. If messages are not 
time tagged in appropriate ways, mistakes in the assessment of 
the order of events may result, and different decision makers may 
discuss the same situation, using data from different points in 
time. 
The third category of problems stems from -he conflict between 
the need to make strategic decisions and the need to manage the 
communication with other centres. If the communication is 
difficult, it may sometimas receive a low priority in relation to 
the more pressing strategic decision tasks, and pressing 
strategic tasks may lead to a low priority for transmitting 
information to other centres. As a consequence, there may be 
delays in the transfer of information to other parts of the 
emergency organisation. 
The fourth category of probleros is related to the content of the 
information communicated. Much of this information is highly 
technical, and not all of the personnel involved have the 
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necessary competence for understanding this kind of info: 
This often leads to Misunderstanding. 
tion. 
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Figure 2.1. The organisations involved in off-site emergency 
management and the principal relations among them. This organi-
sation reflects the set-up in Sweden. 
Johansson, Andersson and Holmstrom (1986) observed a number of 
examples of such misunderstanding in their analysis of drills. 
For example, a list of isotopes was interpreted as a list of 
geographical co-ordinates, and a report about the loss of 
emergency containment coolirg was interpreted to mean total loss 
of core cooling. Reports about wind direction also cause 
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problems, because there are different ways of expressing wind 
direction. Radiation data nay also arrive in different foras, and 
require translation. 
These observations point to an information management problem in 
the emergency organisation. Specifically, difficulties are caused 
by delays and problems in interpreting information. Some of these 
problems should be, if not eliminated, then at least alleviated 
by faster and more reliable forms of communication in a standard 
format to insure that all necessary information was included and 
in a form that could be understood. 
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3. CONCEPTUAL WORK 
The conceptual work started froa the assumption that the problem 
was to design a general system to be used for many different 
kinds of emergencies. This led to the question of what aspects 
could be common to different emergencies, and whether there was 
any form of organisation that would be useful for each of these. 
The literature (e.g.. Dynes, 1974) suggested that emergency 
organisations generally followed a military hierarchical command 
and control structure, but that such an organisation might not be 
suited for all aspects of emergency management. Specifically, the 
results from »any studies of behaviour in emergencies suggested 
that a community would exhibit various forms of self-
organisation, and that a military style command and control 
structure may not be the whole answer to the emergency management 
problem. However, it was not clear which aspects of the total 
emergency management could be left to self-organising forces, and 
which would have to be carried out by some existing organisation. 
These considerations led to work in three different directions: 
- an analysis of the nature and limitations of hierarchical 
command and control systems 
- an analysis of distributed decision making. 
- an analysis of emergency management in an attempt to find 
a general theoretical structure for emergency management. 
3,1 The nature and limitations of hierarchical systems 
The results of the analysis of hierarchical systems (Brehmer, 
1988) suggest that such forms of organisation are useful for two 
different purposes: (1) regulating the complexity of the decision 
problems encountered in an organisation and (2) for coping with 
tasks where one has to consider different time scales, or spatial 
scales. The military hierarchical organisation is an example of 
an organisation that capitalises on both of these strengths of a 
hierarchical organisation. Thus, the division into units at 
different levels regulates complexity: a company commander has to 
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consider a limited number of platoons, and a battalion commander 
a limited nunber of companies, and so on, Moreover, a company 
commander would have to cope with a smaller area than the 
battalion commander, i.e., the different levels in a military 
hierarchy have to consider different scales. 
Whether a hierarchical system will function well depends on the 
extent to which it actually regulates complexity, the extent to 
which different levels in the hierarchy can be tied to different 
scales, and the extent to which communication between levels in 
the form of goals fed from higher levels to lower, and feedback 
fed from lower levels upwards, functions well. Because processing 
of information at each level and communication between levels 
takes time, hierarchical organisations tend to function best 
under conditions where the environment is predictable and the 
demands for fast responding and reorganisation are small. This 
makes them less suited on the management of unknown emergencies, 
and a general organisation for emergency management must there-
fore be built on different principles and involve forms of 
distributed decision making. 
3.2 Analysis of distributed decision making 
The general problem facing an organisation characterised by 
distributed decision making is that of co-ordination of different 
decision makers who have limited and at best partially over-
lapping models of the problem. Moreover, this co-ordination ir.-st 
take place under dynamic conditions, where the state of th>> 
system changes both autonomously and as a consequence of the 
decision makers' actions. This is a new research topic and very 
little is known about what kimf< of organisation or corarau. »cation 
patterns will prove effective under such conditions. 
A review of the literature (Brehmer, 1989a) yielded little 
information of use. Most research of relevance for the problem 
has been carried out in the area of distributed artificial 
intelligence. This research provides some useful concepts, but 
some of the problems analysed are of little relevance. For 
example, in distributed artificial intelligence, it ir. an 
important goal to keep down the need for communication, since the 
costs of communication tend to be high relative to those of 
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computation. However, in distributed decision making, the problem 
is rather to increase the possibilities for ca—un i cat ion. 
Brehmer (1988) and Rasmussen (1986a) have analysed different 
architectures of distributed decision making and how these eight 
function under different circumstances. One proble« here is how a 
distributed organisation could cope with problems involving 
different time scales. This problem seems to require a 
hierarchical organisation, for in this case distributed decision 
making without overall control may lead to local optimisation 
with long term catastrophes *s a consequence. 
The analysis of distributed decision making is, however, only in 
its infancy, but the MICA/INF project has provided a starting 
point for such work which is now carried on in a Esprit II BRA 
project "Hohawc* (ESPRIT 3105). 
3.3 A general theoretical structure for emergency management. 
Work here has followed a control theoretic approach (Brehmer, 
1989b). Emergency management has been defined as a control system 
designed to control the number of injuries/deaths in society. To 
do so effectively, a feedforward strategy is required, which can 
detect possible emergencies and correct for then before they 
occur. This in turn requires a general detection system which 
monitors possible emergencies, and a general diagnosis system for 
diagnosing these emergencies. Neither of these exist today, 
except for more limited forms of emergencies. 
The actual management of emergencies can be analysed in terms of 
Rasmussen's (1986b) abstraction hierarchy (Brehmer, 1939b). Two 
abstract functions: injury/damage control and relief operations 
were suggested. The injury/damage control abstract function was 
then analysed in terms of three generalised functions for 
emergency management: to remove the source of danger, to raise 
barriers between people and the danger, and to remove people from 
the danger. These three generalised functions t.ien take somewhat 
different forms, depending on the type of erc-rgency. In the case 
of a nuclear emergency, reaoving the danger corresponds to 
successful attempts to stop or contain the radiation at the 
plant, creating a barrier might be to recommend the intake of 
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iodine pills, and an example of removing the people would be 
evacuation. 
The county EOC has to make its decisions at the level of these 
generalised functions. Consequently, decision support must be 
developed to aid these particular kinds of decisions. Time-area 
diagrams which show the predicted spread of radiation, as well as 
the predicted course of evacuation, could provide such support. 
When what spreads spreads among persons, rather than over some 
area, the diagram would, of course, be a time-person diagram 
instead. 
Figure 3.1 gives an example of such a time-person diagram for a 
particular form of emergency, that of an epidemic. The disease 
spreads quadratically, but the means to combat it - vaccination 
- works linearly (because one can only vaccinate a given number 
of people per unit time). The diagram gives the general condition 
for success in controlling the epidemic: it is to start 
vaccination so that it has been completed before the disease 
function intersects the vaccination function. 
Figure 3.1. A time-person digram for the problem of fighting 
epidemics using vaccination. 
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Similar time-area diagrams can be constructed for all emergencies 
that spread over area or within a population, and they make it 
possible to decide first, whether a given action may succeed, and 
second, when the action has to be taken to succeed. Thus, we 
might design such diagrams for fires and fire fighting, the 
spread of radiation and the rate of evacuation, or the rate at 
which people take their iodine tablets, and so on. In all these 
cases, it is not a problem to decide which action should be 
taken. The problem is to decide when the action should be taken. 
Representations of this kind should be useful in supporting the 
decision about timing of actions. 
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4. DEVELOPMENT IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
4.1 Technology trends 
Use of information technology has increased drastically over the 
last decade. In all fields of technical, economical, financial, 
and administrative matters, computer systems have become an 
integral part of the work routines. Almost everybody has access 
to a computer terminal. In everyday life people experience this, 
e.g., in bank services where summaries of their accounts and 
payments are done via computer terminals. In summary, this is of 
benefit to most people and has lead to an overall increased 
productivity, but it also shows how vulnerable our society has 
become due to this technology in case of computer system 
breakdowns. This must be kept in mind when applying this 
technology in emergency management. 
The recent advances in information technology might be classified 
into three areas: l) computer hardware, 2) networking and 3) 
computer software. 
1) First of all the computers have improved in cost/performance. 
The price of computers is no longer a major concern. Instead of 
centralised big computers one gets small personal computers or 
workstations distributed where needed in an organisation. 
2) A network between computers which simplifies information 
exchange, e.g., in the form of "electronic mail", is easily 
obtained at low price . 
3) Software is probably the area where advances are most welcome 
in the future. However, user friendly systems are developed and 
applied in a number of disciplines. 
Advances in all these three areas are important for efficient use 
of information technology in emergency management. Networking 
capabilities are especially important for exchanging information 
in large emergency organisations. Here, we will concentrate on 
the latest software tools to see how they can be applied to 
emergency management. 
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4.2 Advances in application of artificial intelligence and 
expert system techniques 
The continuous development of software systems and, in parti-
cular, the possibilities offered by artificial intelligence with 
new symbolic languages has made the development of new informa-
tion and decision support systems attractive. Expert systems is a 
branch of artificial intelligence which has evolved over the last 
years. These systems can contain specialised problem solving 
techniques and expert knowledge within a particular application 
domain. Specific features of these systems, in contrast to 
conventional data processing systems, are their symbolic 
inference, which is supposed to be closer to the way an expert 
reasons and expresses his views about a problem area. 
One of the technologies offered by Artificial Intelligence is an 
integrated development environment on dedicated workstations, 
e.g. Lisp computers, which facilitate incremental system 
development. Lisp computers offer a software environment with 
several tools and implementation techniques for expert system 
applications. The problem is often to choose the best way of 
implementation among many possible alternatives. 
The investigation of these techniques and application of them in 
var'.ous aspects of emergency management was the purpose of this 
joint Nordic project. In case of an emergency there will be a 
number of experts in different problem domains with varying 
background and position in the organisation. This means that a 
computerised system must support a wide variety of functions 
including exchange of information between different user groups. 
No single tool exists for such a diverse application and 
different implementation strategies will be discussed when 
describing the prototype. 
4.3 Review of typical applications of new technology in 
process industry 
In the initial phase of the INF project a literature survey (Berg 
& Yokobayashi, 1985) was made of the various activities in 
development of computerised support systems to assist in 
emergency situations. One such system is developed for the 
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Technical Advisory Body (ETAB) in Japan (Kobayashi, Fujiki, 
Kohsaka & Ishikawa, 1985) for managing a great number of 
documents with information about nuclear power plants and assist 
in fast retrieval of critical information. It will also support 
technical experts with diagnosis, status assessment and 
prediction of radioactive release in order to plan the evacuation 
of people in critical areas. 
Another Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMIS) has been 
developed in the USA (Jaske, 1985) for the planning, exercising 
and real-time management of accident and disaster response. 
Decision making is assisted by a set of simulation models 
involving dose estimation and diffusion from containment to air 
and water. It comprises also simulation of various evacuation 
options integrated with a national map and geographic information 
system. 
From non-nuclear industry one can mention the MannTall system 
(Honne, 1987) which is used in offshore catastrophes to determine 
whereabouts of missing persons during large-scale rescue 
operations. 
In the last year a number of systems and prototypes have been 
reported and several of them are described in detail in the ISEM 
project (ESPRIT 2322). 
4.4 Potentials of new information technology. 
In a large organisation, as that described in the previous chap-
ter, it is obvious that computer networks can assist in keeping 
the various parts of the emergency organisation informed and 
updated about the overall status in case of an accident. Delays 
are minimised and broadcast of important information can be made 
by decision makers. Further, computer systems can be used to 
reduce the problem of information overload by offering the user 
tools for accessing and filtering data. 
In almost p.very part of the organisation procedures there are 
check lists which detail what should be done in case of an 
emergency. Computerisation of procedures are one obvious way of 
utilising new technology and a system has been developed to 
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support on-site personnel (owre, 1987). 
Another application is to support people with diagnostic tasks. 
Recently an experiment was conducted at the OECD Halden Reactor 
Project to assess the effectiveness of the diagnosis expert 
system DISKET (Diagnosis System Using Knowledge Engineering 
Technique) for helping reactor operators diagnose and treat 
malfunctions (Holmstrbm, et al., 1989). The experiment clearly 
showed improvement in performance in the measures related to the 
treatment of the transient malfunctions. This is a very 
significant result, and suggests that diagnosis systems sucn as 
DISKET may provide significant assistance for nuclear reactor 
operators. 
Can these results be extrapolated to emergency situations? it is 
certainly important for on-site personnel to know the precursor 
of an accident better. However, major problems still exist in 
situations where no procedures or diagnostic rules are available. 
The user must be aware of the limited scope of the support 
systems to avoid situations where he is looking for a non-
existing procedure or diagnostic rule to apply. Assistance in 
unforeseen situations is a growing research area in AI. Use of 
deep knowledge models where the physical behaviour of systems are 
described together with the expert rules will improve the 
robustness. 
A system which advises operators in severe accidents is the SPMS, 
Success Path Monitoring System, (Baker, 1988) which aims to 
provide an on-line assessment of both the status of critical 
safety functions and the status of success paths for correcting 
the threat to the critical functions in a plant. The experimental 
evaluation concluded with quite distinct advantages in speed and 
accuracy of operator performance in taking corrective actions. 
The support systems mentioned in this section have not been 
applied in the current NKA/INF prototype system, but should be 
mentioned as candidates for application in future emergency 
management systems. 
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5. PARTICULAR SYSTEMS SPECIFICATION 
The emergency organisation comprises a number of on-site and off-
site Emergency Operation centres (EOCs). A picture of this 
organisation in Sweden is given in Figure 2.1. It illustrates the 
flow of information between various EOCs in emergency situations. 
As can be seen from the figure, there is a number of active 
groups requesting different information from a multitude of 
sources. The on-site people mainly focus on the plant itself, 
concentrating on accident mitigation and performing the 
recommended actions. The off-site part of the organisation deals 
with the possible danger of radioactive release to the environ-
ment and possible evacuation of people if necessary. 
In ordor to specify a Decision Support System (OSS) in this 
environment, the functions and tasks for each EOC must be 
specified as well as the communication paths between the centres. 
The following check-list was applied for each EOC: 
- main tasks 
- subtasks 
- data received 
- data generated 
- data sent 
- desired functions of a DSS 
- needs for status and global overview 
- particular expert knowledge possessed by the centre 
The results of this analysis are described in Berg, et al. (1987) 
and summarised in this chapter. 
5.1 On-site system specification 
5.1.1 Requirements 
During emergencies the people acting in emergency organisations 
have to look at the plant from points of view that differ from 
those used during normal plant operation. There are four main 
areas of information to be dealt with during an emergency. These 
are accident, radiation, actions, and organisations/communication 
to the off-site environment. There is also a corresponding 
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division of responsibilities in the preparedness organisation. 
The shift supervisor and the plant operations manager takes care 
of the process ana the accident. The radiation protection manager 
is responsible for radiation protection and all kinds of matters 
concerning radiation, releases, doses etc. The maintenance 
manager takes care of what happens on-site, outside the control-
room. The contact persons to the nuclear power authorities and to 
the off-site EOC take care of informing the off-site authorities. 
The plant emergency manager has the overall responsibility for 
co-ordination and management of the on-site organisation. 
When an accident has occurred at a nuclear power plant the most 
important questions to be asked are 
- What has happened? 
- How will the accident proceed? 
- How can the plant be brought to a safe state? 
- What kind of help is needed? 
- Does the accident cause danger to people, hew great is the 
danger, to whom and when? 
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Figure 5.1. The main tasks of the on-site emergency organisation. 
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The emergency management system should support decision making on 
these matters. 
The activities of the on-site emergency organisation is schema-
tically represented, in Figure 5.1. The tasks are executed in 
parallel and repeatedly. The plant emergency manager should, 
nevertheless, have a good overview of what is going on. 
Decision making connects diagnosis LO the damage and injury 
control, which is an important part of the activities, because 
tasks in this area do not belong to the normal routine of the 
plant. Relief and repair control does not need special support, 
because repair work, for example, is part of the normal on-site 
activities. 
Sttemai 
analysis 
P'am-
zaa 
-T Critical - - . | Critical — — T 3 
suosyswms ' 
Emergency 
Alertness 
LBV« 
Manual — — 
next 
Vetecr. • 
!fiss:u:e 
'•Weather 
mast 
1 
Plant 
.area rat). 
rrteas. 
Weairrer 
sanation* 
r J 
"1 
T2 
3ad. in containment 
Peactor car« scat« 
S'ifysnine 
S e r ø s e -ates 
Soreacing 
vtarvjai • 
•ncut 
3ackqr0iina • 
-nfcrmation 
Manual -
:ncul 
P-ssibia • 
courses 
of a o c n 
T4 
-L.L 
TS 
Tim« 
CUaijrA.T.3 
frisks/ 
resources) 
Sent 
messages 
(exfemai/ 
internat) 
Figure 5.2. The use of data and knowledge in on-site emergency 
management (PCC=Process Control Computer). The boxes represent 
data transformations. The transformations Tl to T5 are explained 
in the text. The star sign (*) depicts inputs from all data items 
in the figure, e.g. critical functions, time diagrams etc. 
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Figure 5.2 represents the flow of information in on-site emer-
gency management. Physical level data (on the left hand side in 
the figure) are transformed into information on higher levels of 
abstraction as a basis for decision making and (external) 
communication. 
Without an integrated computerised support system these trans-
formations are made manually, with separate and specific com-
puter tools, and sometimes even implicitly, i.e. the concepts 
"emergency alertness level" and "time diagrams" are only in the 
mind of the plant emergency manager. The transformations in the 
figure can be described as follows: 
Tl represents the process of combining the process data in a 
way which expresses whether some of the critical functions 
are jeopardised or not. Examples of critical functions are 
Reactivity control, Reactor core heat removal, and Reactor 
coolant system inventory. Critical subsystems represent a 
measure of to which degree a certain subsystem of the plant 
is available. 
T2 depicts radiation calculation/prediction methods. The 
contents of this box is basically what the radiation 
protection manager is doing. 
T3 copes with external analysis input of whatever analysis 
methods available, such as nuclear plant analysers. Plant 
and radiation data are ccmbined to form a measure of the 
emergency alertness level. This is largely the task of the 
plant operation manager and the operation group. 
T4 accomplishes an evaluation of the possibilities in the 
situation at hand. The input is situation analyses and 
alternative courses of action to cope with the situation, 
T5 represents the fusion of all available information. The 
output is communication, both internal and external, with 
information to be used as a decision basis, directives, 
commands etc. 
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The transformations should be made explicit, because they in a 
way represent the general strategy to deal with the emergency. 
The information contents of the support system should also be 
organised so that the general strategy is explicit all the time. 
The man-support system interaction should happen in two ways, (1) 
manual input of data, such as measurements and external analyses, 
and (2) control of transformations. 
Apart from the functions that actually have been implemented (as 
described in the prototype implementation section) some other 
functions would be very useful: 
layered maps: Haps which can be scaled and panned. Different 
features can be superimposed on the maps: infrastructure, 
demographic data, topographical data, radiation 
measurement data, prognosis for spreading including e.g. 
isodose and isodose rate lines. 
document databases: plant documents, operation documents. 
emergency alertness level assessment: provides information 
about the state of the nuclear power plant on a high level 
of abstraction. It provides, in principle, a strictly 
limited measure of the danger of the situation and 
monitoring of drastic safety related changes of the 
situation. 
resource supervision such as personnel, physical accident 
fighting resources etc. 
5.1.2 Data and knowledge bases 
Items to be included in the data and knowledge bases are the 
following: 
process data to a limited extent: measurements, alarms, 
critical functions, state data from the process computer, 
layered maps, 
local weather condition data, 
measurement stations and measuring routes for patrols, 
including all attributes, 
laboratory analysis data of samples, 
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- emergency operation guidelines, 
- message base, 
- reports and text data, 
- log book including decisions and measures, actions taken, 
- computational algorithms, 
- success criteria for the critical safety functions. 
5.1.3 User interface 
The task of the plant emergency manager is to be in charge of the 
emergency operations and not to interact with computers. 
As a consequence a full scale emergency support system should be 
an easy to use source of information. Therefore WIMP (windows, 
icons, menus, and pointing) interface techniques must be used. 
The role of the system is to advice, guide, and call attention to 
things. 
Except the normal user interfaces also other interfaces must be 
provided, like connection to the process computer, maintenance, 
external data input, and training interfaces. 
5.2 Off-site system specification 
This section is concerned with a specification for the County 
Emergency Operations centre (CEOC) as it exists in one county in 
Sweden, since the system was implemented and tested in that 
environment. This organisation may be unique in some respects, 
and the present specification may therefore not apply to other 
countries, or even to other counties in Sweden. 
5.2.1 Background 
According to Swedish law, the County Board in counties with 
nuclear power plants are responsible for emergency planning in 
the case of a nuclear accident. Emergency plans have been pre-
pared in consultation with competent authorities for radiation 
protection (SSI) and nuclear safety (SKI), with local authorities 
and with the nuclear power plant. 
The County Board reports directly to the government, but is 
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autonomous within its sphere of authority. 
5.2.2 The County Board Emergency Organisation 
In the case of a nuclear accident, a County Board Emergency 
Organisation (CEOC) is activated, see Fig. 5.3. The emergency 
organisation in Fig. 5.3 is presently under revision due to new 
national laws pertaining to emergency preparedness and emergency 
organisations. However, major changes in the emergency organi-
sation are not foreseen. The organisation shown in Fig. 5.3 has 
been subject to a number of drills, and analyses of the results 
from such drills form the general background for the systems 
tested in this reported. 
The CEOC follows a general emergency plan. This plan contains 
- Alarm functions 
- Information to the public 
- Issuing of iodine tablets to the public 
- Protective measures, such as evacuation 
- Measurement of radiation levels 
The area surrounding the nuclear power plant is divided into an 
emergency zone and a measurement zone. Within the emergency zone, 
there are highly detailed plans for 
- Alarming the public with automatic technical systems 
- Immediate intake of iodine tablets in case of a radioactive 
release. Iodine tablets have been distributed. 
- Evacuation 
- Written information to the public 
Within an area outside the power pl~nt, the measurement zone, 
measurements of radiation levels will be performed by the fire 
department which reports to the CEOC. 
One of the CEOC:s staff members is assigned the role of acting 
Emergency officer. S/he initiates immediate actions upon alarm 
that a nuclear accident has happened or is likely to happen. 
Separate plans are prepared for different levels of emergency. 
Other parts of the emergency organisation are alerted. The aim is 
to have the full organisation in operation within 2 hr. 
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SSI and SKI are the »ain advisory bodies. 
As the accident proceeds, and when a decision on protective 
action is taken, nu—ro« contacts will take place with all 
organisations and authorities involved in the emergency plan, *s 
well ms with agencies not included in the plan. The public will 
continuous information. 
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27 
5.2.3 Requirements on an information system 
In case of a nuclear accident, the CEOC will need information on 
- what happened, 
- has there been a release of radioactive substances, or is such 
a release likely to occur, 
- weather conditions: rain, wind speed and direction, temperature, 
- actions taken on the site 
- data on radiation levels as measured by the plant, the fire 
brigade, or SSI 
- prognosis concerning the <? ^lopment of the accident 
In addition, information to and from various authorities, 
organisations, and to the public has to be issued and received. 
Information will reach the CEOC from the plant, SSI and SKI, as 
well as from other central and local authorities and from the 
various units of the emergency organisation. As the emergency 
progresses, the amount of information will be considerable. 
The information system should assist the CEOC in obtaining an up 
to date, clear picture of the overall situation. Such a picture 
is of utmcst importance for making adequate decisions both in the 
emergency organisation and with respect to protective actions. A 
continuously updated picture should be available to all parts of 
the emergency organisation. 
In an emergency organisation, there will be great pressure upon 
the information department in the CEOC. The public will demand 
the latest information about radiation levels, protective actions 
and the general situation at the plant. Good operational control 
of the emergency is a prerequisite for good functioning of the 
information department. 
The information system should register when information has 
reached the CEOC, the sender, and the content of the information. 
T.n that way, the information system should support decision 
making activities and that no actions are overlooked. Decisions 
and actions to be taken are those specified in the plan. The 
system ?'iould register when a decision or action has been 
performed and store the content. Recall of information or 
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decisions should be possible at any time. 
In addition, the system should provide sorting functions (sender, 
urgency, keywords, and topics) to track information received or 
issued. 
5.2.4 User interface 
The task of the emergency office of the CEOC is complex and 
demanding. The computer systems should be user friendly, and 
guide, advice and call attention to actions. 
The system should be available to all units of the CEOC so that 
each member of the centre has access to the same information. 
Preferably, authorities outside the CEOC should also have the 
information and communication via special communication lines. In 
particular, connections should be arranged with SKI and SSI. 
5.2.5 The prototype system 
The prototype system can only test some of the functions 
mentioned above. The most important functions in the prototype 
system are the message system and thi logging and reminder 
functions in the form of the emergency preparedness guide. 
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6. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
It was never the intention to make a complete prototype for the 
full on-site and off-site organisation within the scope of 
NKA/INF. Instead, it focused on two key nodes in the organi-
sation: the on-site Plant Emergency Manager and the chief of the 
off-site County EOC. The two prototypes implemented for the on-
site and off-site users have approximately the same functiona-
lity. Only some minor aspects differ. The differences are due to 
the different environments where the support systems are to be 
used. An example of this is the different set of categories 
supplied for messages to be sent. 
Prototyping was done on Symbolics computers utilising the Lisp 
environment with object oriented programming techniques. The on-
site system was made by VTT, Finland while IFE, Norway imple-
mented the off-site system. Common functions in these two proto-
types were exchanged between the two partners to avoid 
duplication of work. 
The particular system functions developed reflect the needs 
identified during system requirement specification. Three major 
functions are included: 1) Preparedness guide, 2) Reminder and 3) 
Message handling. 
1) In most centres a set of written procedures has been prepared 
to guide people in emergency management, especially in the 
initial phase. The emergency preparedness guide is implemented 
almost in its original form and from a momentary menu one can 
choose what section to look at. As one proceeds down the 
procedure, there is space available for making time stamps and 
writing comments. 
2) The reminder function is a way for the decision maker to make 
sure that he/she will remember important duties as an emergency 
develops. These duties may, for instance, involve sanding status 
reports every half hour, or checking that important tasks have 
been carried out as ordered. In addition the decision maker can 
make use of this function to input important things he will be 
reminded about later on. 
3) The message handling system is developed to »upport decision 
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makers with the large amount of information exchanged during 
emergencies. Information overflow, misinterpretations, incon-
sistencies, and prioritization are typical problems encountered 
during emergency drills. 
The other functions described below are auxiliary or special 
features required for the two particular interfaces implemented, 
i.e., that for the plant emergency manager and that for the chief 
of the county EOC. 
6.1 Basic man-machine principles 
The man-machine interface is a key part of this decision support 
system serving a number of people with different background and 
needs. This type of system will not be in daily use, so the 
screen layouts and dialogue features should be made as self-
explanatory and informative as possible. Mouse sensitive items in 
window systems and fixed or momentary context related menus 
offered by modern workstations have been utilised to accomplish 
this goal. 
A typical way of interaction between the user and the system 
follows the pattern shown in the figure below. 
User 
Move mouse i 
! I 
! Item highlighted 
mouse documentation 
j presented 
__±~ 
! Click mouse 
i 
' X-
Selected operation j 
performed | I ZT 
Figure 6.1 Mouse operation 
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- Mouse 
On the screen there is a mouse symbol shown as an arrow. When the 
rouse device is moved, the position of the mouse symbol on the 
screen will change correspondingly. 
When the mouse symbol is placed on a command field, the field 
will be highlighted, i.e., a rectangular box will be displayed 
around the text. The fact that a field is highlighted means that 
a command can be executed. The mouse device has three push-
buttons on top of it, which are used for giving commands. 
Possible mouse actions are always listed in the mouse documen-
tation line on the screen and will give additional information to 
the user. 
- Screen 
The screen consists of a set of smaller windows, which are called 
panes. The general layout is shown in Figure 6.2. This picture 
can always be displayed by clicking at the text in the top level 
menu. From this picture you can select message handling, phone 
directory, preparedness guide and the reminder function. When 
needed, the user is asked to input text in special panes. 
Other aspects of the man machine interface can be summarised as 
follows: 
1) Feedback on mouse clicks: 
In some cases, when a mouse sensitive item has been clicked, 
immediate feedback on the command is given. The item may 
change from inverse video to normal background colour (the 
command field is changed to white text on a black background). 
2) Pop-up windows: 
A pop-up window is a window which is not part of the permanent 
screen, but "pops up" over the other windows in special cases, 
like the reminding function. 
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6.2 Particular System Functions 
6.2.1 Preparedness guide 
The preparedness guide is a computerised form of the actions 
which the user of the support system is supposed to perform, or 
more concretely the procedures to be found in the preparedness 
plan. 
On the far right hand side of the screen (Figure 6.2) there is a 
pane labelled "Items in preparedness guide". The contents of this 
pane is a list of numbers indicating the procedures that have not 
yet been successfully performed. The rest of the screen displays 
the procedures and possible documentation. Space is left for 
comments and time-stamping. 
The procedures are mouse sensitive and by clicking on them a 
small menu pops up. The choices are "Task performed" and "Did not 
succeed". By choosing one of these a time stamp is printed on 
the screen. If the task is indicated performed, the number of the 
task disappears from the "Items in preparedness guide" pane on 
the far right hand side and tlie black box on the number of the 
procedure disappears as an indication of successful action. 
Comments on the procedures can be inserted if needed. 
Some of the procedures contain separate mouse sensitive items in 
bold face. These are items that have special documentation 
available. By clicking on one of them the corresponding 
documentation is printed on the lower part of the screen. 
All of the procedures cannot be shown on the screen at the same 
time, because the list is too long. To get more procedures one 
can either click on the scroll bar in the guide-pane or click on 
the number of one of the procedures in the "Items in preparedness 
guide" pane. 
If some of the procedures need to be performed repeatedly the 
"Reminder*' command can be used to help the user remember this, 
see below. 
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6.2.2 Message handling 
The message handling function is particularly adapted for 
emergency management applications. It makes it possible to send 
messages to a pre-specified set of centres equipped with the same 
kind of support system that the sender has. 
Two layouts of the screen are used for the message handling 
system. One is used for writing messages, the other for reading 
messages and other functions (see Figure 6.3}. The column in the 
middle, consisting of two panes, shows the "current message", 
i.e., the message on which all actions, except writing, are per-
formed . 
The column to the left is labelled "Message handling" and 
consists of five panes. The first of these shows a record of mes-
sages that have been received, the second a record uf messages 
that have been written by the user. Messages received, but not 
read, and messages written, but not sent, are shown in inverse 
video. The third pane shows a menu to be used for sorting pa-
rameter selection. The last two panes display sort keys and 
sorted messages. 
When a message arrives, a small window pops up under the mouse 
blinker. The content of the window gives information about the 
sender and the name of the message. 
In the column to the right, which is the same in all layouts, a 
small pane labelled "Message system status" shows two pieces of 
information: number of messages received and number of messages 
which have not been read. This information is always kept up to 
date. 
Each message has a number of attributes, such as code, name, time 
created, time sent, time read, sender's name and position, 
receiver's name and position, category, priority and topic. All 
of these do not necessarily have to be used, but some are, 
however, compulsory. A short description of the attributes is 
given below. 
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- code tells who the sender is and ho.j many 
messages he has sent. Thus, the code PEM-
4 is the code for the fourth message from 
the plant emergency manager. 
- name a short description of the contents of 
the message in the form of a headline 
- time stamps created automatically 
- sender name supplied automatically 
- sender position supplied automatically 
- receiver name supplied automatically when a message is 
answered, otherwise optional 
receiver position supplied automatically when answering a 
message, must otherwise be supplied 
- priority compulsory, with categories "urgent", 
"normal", "low" 
- category compulsory, one or more from a 
pre-specified set 
- topic a means for organising messages according 
to topics that the user can specify. It 
will not be sent but is used for sorting 
messages. 
6.2.3 Reminder function 
The reminder command allows the user to input texts that have to 
be remembered either at certain points in time or repeatedly. 
When you enter the reminder function in the top level menu, the 
window shown below is displayed. 
You place the cursor at 'string' and input your own text. Then 
enter when (how many hours and minutes from present time) the 
reminder should appear. You may als^ choose to have the reminder 
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appearing several times, at intervals. In that case another menu 
will appear, and time interval in hours and minutes has to be 
specified. 
! Remind user input 
} — ' — ' • — 
| What to remind: ' string ' 
How many hours from now: 0 
How many minutes from now: 1 
Reminded more than once: No Yes 
i 
: done abort 
I Specify remind interval 
| Repeat interval in hours: 0 
; Repeat interval in minutes: 5 
done abort 
While you are performing other tasks, the reminder display will 
appear on the screen at the point where the cursor happen to be 
located at the time of reminding, like all other pop-up menus. 
When removed, by moving cursor, it will reappear in the reminder 
field on the screen. By placing the cursor in this field, you can 
have a look at the message again. 
6.2.4 Phone directory 
Phone directories with numbers to all organisations active in 
emergency management is included. The directories can be searched 
through to find numbers according to name and position of people 
and organisations. 
6.2.5 Alarm lists 
The "Alarm Lists" command provides lists of people to be ularmed 
for different positions in the preparedness organisation. The 
"On-site Organisation" command also provides support for setting 
up the preparedness organisation on-site. 
38 
6.2.6 Trend displays 
Trend displays for the most important process and environment 
parameters are provided on-site. Five different trends or bar 
charts can be shown at a time. 
6.3 On-site system 
6.3.1 User interface 
The implementation is structured in a top-down manner with the 
user interface on top. Below this is a number of independent 
modularly implemented functions. The user interface makes use of 
a large number of special non-standard extensions to Common Lisp. 
This was necessary to make it as user-friendly as possible, but 
the cost is lack of portability. The prototype system can without 
modifications be used solely on Symbolics machines. Common Lisp 
as such does not support the construction of WIMP interfaces 
(Windows, Icons, Menus and Pointing). 
The user interface is mouse and menu driven. The keyboard is 
needed only for a few operations, such as typing messages or 
comments on items in the preparedness guide. 
6.3.2 Scenario implementation (SCEDLA) 
A SCEnario Description LAnguage (SCEDLA) allowing for "simu-
lation" of events and processes has been developed. SCEDLA en-
ables description of scenarios using a high level description 
language. The intention of 'scenario description' is to pre-
specify messages to be sent at certain time points and the 
'simulation* of process and radiation parameters. This is a 
useful facility for training rnd evaluation purposes. A facility 
to make the pre-specified scenario branch according to what 
actions the user takes is also included, although it has not been 
actively used in the tests. 
Functions, which have been (partly) specified but not implemented 
include 
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- aaps and state displays showing radiation levels etc. (the 
basic saps are actually implemented but without the needed 
dynamic features) 
- EAL (Emergency Alertness Level) system keeping track of 
action levels, resources, etc. 
- predictive functions 
- inclusion of radiation calculation software 
- critical function and subsystem monitoring 
6.4 Off-site system 
The off-site system is designed to support the chief of the 
County Energency Operation Centre (CEOC) in Uppsala, Sveden. 
Background information was extracted from their current handbook. 
The three basic procedures (information, warning, alarm) ranged 
according to severity, were implemented in the preparedness 
guide. All phone lists were included and grouped according to the 
classification in the handbook. The message system was 
initialised with data on sites and organisations in Uppsala and 
Sweden. Operation of the interface and details of particular 
functions are described in previous sections. 
6.4.1 Cff-Site scenario implementation 
The scenario consists of a number of messages which are sent to 
the test subject (chief of CEOC) at defined time points. The 
experimenter used a workstation with almost the same features as 
the CEOC configuration to store the messages used in the 
scenario. By utilising the facilities of the message system, the 
experimenter could write, edit and delete messages as desired. A 
few extra functions were developed for the experimenter. For 
instance, one can easily choose among different scenarios, 
initialise scenario time and make hard copy for documentation. 
Two Symbolics computers were connected to each other via an 
Ethernet cable. One of them was located in an experimental 
control room at IFE, Halden, where the test subject (head of 
CEOC) could read information from the system. When inputting data 
and sending messages the subject was assisted by a terminal 
operator familiar with the functions of the system. 
4C 
The other coaputer was placed in the roo« next door to siaulate 
the "outside world", which itjns the rest of the emergency 
organisation. The outside world was in reality the experimenter 
sending nmssaqms defined in the scenario. In addition the 
experimenter had to answer any question raised by the test 
subject via Messages to the outside world. 
An equivalent installation was aade in Uppsala to carry out part 
of the experiaents. 
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7. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE PROTOTYPE SYSTEM 
7.1 General considerations 
In actual practice, it has proved difficult to evaluate informa-
tion systems and decision support systems in full scale tests. 
Indeed, with some exceptions (e.g., Baker, et al. , 1988; 
Holmstrom, et al., 1989) most full scale evaluations show no 
effects of the information or decision support system. This is 
hardly surprising: a given system can at best help with some 
small part of the total decision task, and there is no guarantee 
that this particular part will prove decisive in a given full 
scale evaluation. 
Because of this difficulty, attempts to find alternatives have 
been made. One such alternative method proposed by Rouse and his 
associates (undated) is called conceptual evaluation. 
A conceptual evaluation does not involve any empirical test of 
the system. Instead, the capabilities built into the system are 
compared with the demands as assessed in some analysis of the 
task. If there is a match between the capabilities and functions 
built into the system and the demands made by the task, the 
system passes the conceptual evaluation. Even though the method 
as proposed by Rouse, et al. is quite detailed and explicit, in 
the final analysis it nevertheless rests on judgement, and the 
results of a conceptual evaluation are therefore vulnerable to 
criticism. 
Such a conceptual evaluation has been performed for the present 
system in that they have been explicitly designed to meet certain 
needs found in the analysis of emergency management problem. 
Thus, the Studsvik group's analysis (Johansson, et al., 1986) of 
epergency organisation drills resulted in the specifications for 
the message handling system. Specifically, the Studsvik group 
concluded that decision makers in the emergency organisation may 
not always have s clear picture of the situation, and that this 
could be understood in terms of deficiencies in the information 
flow. 
The reminder functions were designed on the basis 7 experimental 
results by Belardo, Karwan and Wallace (1384), which strongly 
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indicated the need for a reminding function in that they found, 
(1) that many tasks were forgotten in emergency management, and 
(2) that introduction of memory aids improved performance. 
A second form of a more limited evaluation is a function eval-
uation. Such an evaluation involves an attempt to ascertain 
whether the functions built into the system actually have the 
effects that have been assumed by the designers of the system. 
This involves testing the system under conditions where the 
functions built into the system could be used to advantage, and 
assessing (1) whether they are in fact used, and (2) whether they 
lead to better performance. 
The method chosen for the empirical evaluation of the present 
system was that of a function evaluation. Specifically, the 
empirical evaluation was an attempt to assess the extent to which 
the message handling function and the reminder function had the 
effects assumed in the specification, i.e., whether the message 
handling function would lead to a better understanding of the 
situation and whether the reminding function led to more of the 
necessary tasks in the emergency plan being performed. 
7.2 General characteristics of the evaluation. 
The general plan for the evaluation was to have persons who have 
experience in emergency management perform in scenarios which 
required them to actually carry out all the tasks required by the 
emergency plan. C^re was taken to construct scenarios that would 
be realistic with respect to the number of tasks that would have 
to be performed and with respect to their real time 
characteristics. Thus, these scenarios would require the subjects 
to have a good understanding of the situation and to remember 
their tasks. 
Two experiments were carried out, one involving the on-site 
system and one involving the off-site system. Two scenarios were 
constructed for each evaluation. 
The on-site scenarios required the subjects to take the role of 
plant emergency managers. The off-s>ite scenarios required them to 
take the role of acting head of the organisation, i.e., the 
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position taken by the first senior decision maker reaching the 
CEOC. Under normal conditions, this person holds this position 
until the county governor and chief of staff arrive, who then 
take over. However, in the present scenarios, these persons did 
not arrive during the scenarios, so the subject had to continue 
in the role of acting head throughout the scenario and thus for a 
longer time than would normally be the case. 
The scenarios for the on-site evaluation involved emergencies at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant in Finland. The off-site 
scenarios involved emergencies at the Forsmark nuclear power 
plant outside of Uppsala. 
7.3 Design 
The design of both the on-site and off-site evaluation experiment 
followed a within-subjects design, so that each subject performed 
in two scenarios, one with the system (the experimental 
condition) and one without the system (the control condition). 
This was necessary because there are very few qualified subjects 
for experiments of this kind to design experiments with different 
subjects in each condition. 
7.4 Subjects 
In the on-site evaluation, the subjects were four members of the 
staff of the Loviisa nuclear power plant who all had experience 
as plant emergency manager from drills at the plant. 
In the off-site evaluation, the subjects were five senior civil 
servants from county government (lensstyrelsen) in Uppsala 
county. All of them had regular assignments in the county 
emergency management organisation and considerable experience in 
various positions in that organisation. 
7.5 Scenarios 
The scenarios were constructed as real time scenarios of nuclear 
emergencies. Each scenario lasted for about 2 1/2 hr. 
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The scenarios were designed as a series of messages which were 
sent to the subjects and required some kind of response or 
decision, including actions to carry out the emergency plan as 
the scenario developed. To carry out their tasks, the subjects 
had to send messages, either via the computer system or via 
telephone or telefax. 
Care was taken in the development of the scenarios to have the 
sequence of events unfold in real time. When subjects asked for 
additional information, or for tasks to be carried out that had 
not been foreseen in the scenario, an attempt was made to have 
these tasks take the time they should reasonably take, and if the 
subjects asked for information about how the tasks were carried 
out before they could reasonably have been completed, he or she 
was told that the task had not yet been completed, or that no 
information was available. 
7.5.1 On-site evaluation. 
The scenarios used in the on-site evaluation were based on 
earlier drills at the Loviisa plant. 
Both scenarios on-site are mainly LOCAs (loss of coolant acci-
dents) . They differ in consequences for people and environment, 
but also in technical detail. 
Scenario 1 starts with a very small leakage in an emergency 
cooling system. The leakage grows to a big pipe break when the 
repair team is working on it. The repair team is injured and the 
situation turns into a site and general emergency. The releases 
to the environment are relatively small. 
The initiating event of scenario 2 is a large leakage in the 
primary circuit. This causes reactor and turbine trips which in 
turn leads to a loss of electricity supply from the national 
grid. This together with some malfunctions in the process leads 
to radiation releases to the environment. Some of the communi-
cation links to the outside world are not operating properly. 
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7.5.2 Off-site evaluation. 
The scenarios used in the off-site evaluation were based on plant 
specific conditions, features and accident analyses pertaining to 
the Forsuark power plant, and on specific organisational and 
geographic conditions related to the County of Uppsala and its 
County Board. Consequently, the scenarios could not be used for 
other sites without modification. 
As for the on-site evaluation, two scenarios were developed with 
two different types of accidents. The technical background as 
well as the time scale and the sequence of events differ for the 
two scenarios. The two accidents make different demands upon the 
CEOC. 
Swedish nuclear power plants are equipped with filtered 
containment venting systems. When pressure in the containment is 
relieved through the filter system, the release will be at most 
0-1% of the core inventory, excluding noble gases. The 
containment spray accomplishes the containment flooding, but the 
atmosphere has to be relieved through the filter to meet the 
requirements with respect to ambient containment pressure. This 
becomes necessary in one of the scenarios. In the other scenario, 
the filtered containment venting system is by-passed as a 
consequence of an isolation valve failure. Two scenarios will be 
described shortly in the following. 
Scenario 1: Steam line break - LOCA accident with unfiltered 
release of activity. The scenario starts with a main steamline 
break outside the containment. The reactor shut down succeeds, 
but the reactor cooling systems fail for various reasons. The 
core is partly uncovered for 20-30 minutes until re-flooding is 
successful. When the core is uncovered, several fuel pins burst, 
and cause a radioactive release. Furthermore, the isolation 
valves in the broken steamline fail. As a consequence of the 
isolation valve failure, a pathway release of radio-activity to 
the environment is established. 
Isolation of the steam line succeeds 1.5 hr after the break. At 
that time the release to the environment stops. 
An emergency alarm is given to the CEOC and the Alarm station in 
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Uppsala. The subject then has to decide about what actions in the 
emergency plan that are called for. He/she has to be in contact 
with SSI and SKI. Other authorities also contact the CEOC asking 
for information and instructions. In addition, some interaction 
within the emergency organisation and with the public is re-
quired. 
Measurement values are provided by the Forsmark plant and by the 
head of the indication group, which is part of the emergency 
organisation. 
Scenario 2: Reactor core melt down with subsequent release of 
radioactivity from the containment building. Scenario 2 started 
with a loss of off-site power with subsequent diesel generator 
failure at F3 until all DC power is lost. This means that core 
cooling becomes impossible. The cere therefore becomes uncovered 
and snoerheated. Subsequently, the core starts to melt, and 
approximately 1.5 hr after the power failure, the core melts 
through the reactor pressure vessel. After the core melt, the 
crew manages to fill the containment with water using external 
mobile pumps. The pressure in the containment due to the 
increasing amount of water has to be relieved through the filter 
within 24 hr to meet the requirements with respect to ambient 
containment pressure. The CEOC can determine the time of the 
release, within certain limits, to minimise the consequences for 
the public. 
The scenario starts with a telephone call from a journalist who 
asks for details about the awkward situation in Forsmark. Shortly 
after that, the information about a non-normal event reaches the 
CEOC. After only 20 more minutes, there is a general emergency 
alarm. The CEOC must now take action according to the emergency 
plan. Information from SKI and SSI is available about 1 hr after 
the initial event. As in the first scenario, various internal ?nd 
external agencies present problems and requests for information. 
The subject faces two problems: to decide about appropriate 
protective actions motivated by the unstable situation before the 
release, and to decide about the appropriate time for the planned 
depressurisation, and the appropriate protective actions to be 
taken in connection with this release. 
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7.6 General experimental set-up 
In both the on-site and off-site evaluations, the experiment was 
carried out using two rooms, as illustrated in Figure 7.1. One 
room represented the plant emergency manager's office and the 
CEOC, respectively, while the other represented the rest of the 
world, so to speak. The subject war in the former room, together 
with the experimenter, who observed his or her behaviour, and 
carried the telefax messages when required. In the experimental 
condition, the subjects were also provided with art intelligent 
interface in the form of an operator to help the subject use the 
information system. This was necessary because there was very 
little time for special training with the information system. 
In the experimental conditions, the subjects had three means of 
communication: the computer system, telephone and telefax. They 
were allowed to use whatever system th^y wanted. In the control 
condition, the subjects could only communicate via telephone and 
telefux. 
In both conditions, the subjects had access to their ordinary 
handbook for emergency management. In the case of off-site 
emergency management, this handbook contains all procedures and 
tasks to be performed, lists of personnel, and maps and 
information about radiation measurement sites and about the 
population of the area. In the on-site case, the handbook has the 
corresponding information relevant for the on-site emergency 
management and organisation. Thus, this handbook contained all 
the information available in the computer about the emergency 
preparedness guide, as well as information not available in the 
computer system. 
In the off-site case, the subjects also had a map of the relevant 
area around the Forsmark plant as they would have in the real 
CEOC. 
In the other room there was one or two persons, whose task it was 
to send the messages in the scenario via the computer (in the 
experimental condition) or via telephone (in the control 
condition). These persons also answered all questions that the 
subjects might have, and generally responded to the subjects' 
decisions in the way required by the scenario. This required 
48 
TELEPHONE 
TELER« 
SUBJECT OPERATOR 
I
< » 
EXPERIMENTERS 
COMMANDS 
STATUS REPORTS 
REQUESTS 
MESSAGES TO SUBJECT WIIX BE DELAYED, 
INCOMPLETE AND SOMETIMES ROSE AND 
CONTRADICTORY 
Figure 7.1 Schematic set-up of experiment, 
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considerable powers of improvisation, and thus extensive know-
ledge of the nature of nuclear emergency management in general 
and the scenarios used in the experiment in particular, for not 
all questions and actions by the subjects had been foreseen in 
the design of the scenarios. Thus, these persons truly played 
"the rest of the world". 
7.7 Dependent variables 
All messages sent via the computer system were recorded and a 
hard copy taken. All telephone conversations were recorded and 
transcribed. As no decisions can be taken without communication, 
these records provide a complete account of the decisions 
actually made in the scenario, and it is possible to ascertain 
the extent to which the subjects actually carried out their tasks 
by examining these records. These records provide a rich source 
for the analysis of decision making during emergency management. 
However, in the present context the analysis has been limited to 
those aspects that are relevant to the evaluation of the 
information system, i.e., the extent to which the subjects 
carried out the tasks in the emergency preparedness guide. 
To measure the extent to which the subjects achieved a good 
understanding of the situation, they were given a press release 
to edit every hour. These releases contained errors, and the 
extent to which these errors were detected provides an additional 
measure of the extent of which the subjects have a good under-
standing of the situation. However, the best assessment of that 
is, of course, whether they performed the tasks in the emergency 
preparedness guide in an appropriate way. 
In addition, the subjects were interviewed after they had com-
pleted the second scenario. The interview was performed to obtain 
measures of user satisfaction and suggestions concerning how the 
system could be improved. Thus, the interview covered three 
areas: the extent to which the subjects found the system useful 
in the experiment, the extent to which the system would be useful 
in a real emergency management situation, and how the system 
could be improved. 
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8. RESULTS AND EVALUATION 
8.1 Performance of the tasks 
Considering the few subjects involved in the experiments, it was 
not possible to detect any statistically significant differences 
in how the tasks were carried out in the experimental and control 
conditions. The end situation was similar, and in both conditions 
the subjects brought the emergency under control. 
The emergency preparedness guide - which served as a major memory 
aid - was used in both conditions, either in the form of the 
handbook or in the form of the guide in the computer system. 
Thus, subjects had the same memory aids in both conditions, and 
used them in the same way. 
The special reminding function was generally not used. In the few 
cases when it was used, this seemed to be more out of curiosity 
in seeing how it would function than out of real need for being 
reminded. 
Analysis of the press releases revealed no differences in under-
standing of the situation in the two conditions. 
User satisfaction was generally high in the off-site evaluation. 
All subjects found the system useful in the experiment, and 
thought that it would be useful also in a real emergency. One 
subject said that he preferred working with the system compared 
to working with the real organisation, but the other subjects 
thought that it would only be a complement. Specifically these 
subjects found the communication via the system cold and 
impersonal and thought that it led to loss of important 
information that would be available in face-to-face com-
munication, with the system, there was no immediate feedback from 
the other people, and no way of assessing the morale and state of 
mind. The automatic documentation provided by the system was 
considered useful in that it relieved the subjects of a task that 
they would otherwise have to perform manually. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that the subjects, 
both in the on-site and off-site evaluations often had a number 
of unread messages in the system, turning to these when they had 
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completed whatever task they were performing. This suggests that 
the subjects had a greater control over their own working 
situation with the system than they had in the control condition 
where they were often interrupted by telephone calls. However, 
this did not adversely affect their performance in the control 
conditions. In a real emergency, much of the communication would 
presumably be in written form just as in the experimental 
condition here, e.g., in the form of telefaxes, and may end up in 
a pile of unread messages, just as was the case when the subjects 
worked with the system. However, it seems reasonable to assume 
that it would be harder to find the unread messages from such a 
pile of telefaxes and other pieces of paper than with the system. 
The off-site evaluation subjects pointed to the automatic logging 
of messages as an important advantage of the system. Compared to 
traditional forms of logging, the system could provide one 
important advantage: the information might be made available to 
all members of the emergency organisation in a simple way. 
The subjects in the off-site evaluation thought that they had 
learned about emergency management from taking part in the 
experiment, especially when working with the system. This gave a 
better overview of what went on than one would usually get from 
taking part in a drill. They therefore thought that the system 
could fill an important function in training people in the 
emergency organisation. 
The subjects in the on-site evaluation were less enthusiastic. 
One of the four subjects in this condition refused to use the 
system, finding it too cumbersome, and used the telephone 
instead. The other subjects remarked on the lack of face-to-face 
communication, which led to considerable uncertainty about what 
was going on. At least one of the subjects was certain that he 
would not use the system in a real emergency. This difference 
between the on- and off-site evaluations is easy to understand in 
view of the actual communication patterns. A large part of the 
communication of the Plant Emergency Manager is with persons who 
are in the same room (the Emergency Operations Facility). In the 
off-site evaluation, on the other hand, more of the communication 
is with various agencies at some considerable distance from the 
CEOC, e.g., the plant, the police, SKI and SSI, so here the 
communication via the system did not disturb the usual patterns 
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of face-to-face contact. 
The subjects in both evaluations agreed that: the system in its 
present form was too difficult to use without: the aid on a 
trained operator. If such a system were to be installed in the 
emergency operations centres, even in a simplified and more user 
friendly form, it would require an operator. This should, 
perhaps, not only be taken as a criticism of the interface of the 
present system, but also as an expression of kinds of functions 
the subjects would be willing to actually perform in an 
emergency. 
8.2 Suggestions 
The subjects offered a number of suggestions concerning how the 
system could be improved. 
- It should be possible, not only to see which messages had been 
sent and received, but also which of the messages they had sent 
that had not been answered, 
- Maps with radiation measurement would be useful, 
- There should be a hard copy of all messages, 
- The windows containing messages received and sent should be 
larger so that there would be less need for scrolling, 
- The system should be operated by someone at a master terminal 
who read all messages and routed them to those who needed them, 
either for taking action or for their information. 
8.3 Discussion 
It was impressive how well the subjects did in both the experi-
mental and the control condition. As a consequence of the high 
level of performance in the control condition, when the subjects 
worked without the information system, there was not much chance 
of detecting any effects of the system. There are nt least four 
possible explanations for this. 
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The first possibility is that the scenarios were too simple, and 
tha*. they did not make the kinds of demands that a real emergency 
does. This is true to sone extent, for in these experiments, the 
subjects worked alone, and they were freed from their ordinary-
organisational tasks that would have been necessary to make the 
CEOC function smoothly in a real emergency. But even if these 
organisational tasks are demanding and require much time, they 
are nevertheless routine tasks and they are not central to the 
decision making tasks evaluated here. In this latter respect, the 
emergency scenarios were designed to incorporate all those events 
that would be part of a real emergency, and for considerable 
periods of time in these scenarios, the subjects were quite busy 
carrying out their tasks. 
Another factor here is that the "rest of the world" was played by-
one person. Thus, regardless of whether he answered questions in 
his role as SSI, SKI or Plant emergency manager, he did so with a 
co^olete picture of the total situation. As a consequence, the 
answers the subji cts got mo/ well have been better tbin those 
they would have received in a real emergency. This may be part of 
the explanation why the subjects performed so well in both 
scenarios. 
The third possibility is that the scenarios did not adequately 
test the functions of the information systems. Even though there 
were quite a number of messages, the/ were all rather accurate, 
there was no false information or misunderstandings in the 
messages, and they arrived in an appropriate order. It sho^  Id be 
noted that, in view of the origins of these messages and the 
progress of the accident, there seemed to be no possibilities of 
designing the messages in any other way. 
A fourth possibility is that Johansson, et al 11986) in t!~.eir 
analyses of results from drills overestimated the general work 
load on the decision makers in the organisation. There are two 
arguments for this. First, these analyses were made at a stage 
when the research group had not yet learned so much about the 
emergency management task, and this may have made this seer, nore 
complex than it is to experienced decision makers in the 
emergency management organisation. Second, these analyses wer^ 
based on drills during 1985. Since then, the off-site 
organisation :\AS been revised and the members of the organisation 
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have accumulated consider M e additional experience. This is 
especially true of the organisation in Uppsala froai which the 
subjects in this evaluation cane. This organisation was heavily 
involved in the Chernobyl disaster; Uppsala county was subject to 
radioactive fall out fro« Chernobyl and it was first thought that 
this fall-out came fro« the Forsmark plant close to Uppsala, 
therefore the emergency organisation was activated and had to 
operate for a number of days. This gave the organisation valuable 
experience, and may well have led to a better organisation and 
better procedures. It may well be, therefore, that an analysis of 
a drill of the kind undertaken by Johansson et al in 1935 would 
have revealed few«:., problems in the current Uppsala organisation 
*:han was found in the original analyses. 
Observations of the subjects showed that they were able to use 
their experience from earlier drills in ways that sispIifieJ the 
task. Once the subjects had identified the Kind of probien they 
were working with, they seemed to have standard scripts for 
handling it. Consequently, new information could be fitted into a 
well formed scenario, and the problems of keeping a good 
understanding of the situation seened not to be overwhelning. 
This is not to say that the subjects* understanding of the 
situation always was the same, but due to the linited action 
possibilities, this did not lead to any great differences in 
actual decisions. Onr« the level of emergency har been 
determined, the decisions are structured by the eaergency 
preparedness guide, leaving little room for individual 
differences in decisions. 
There is some support for this third alternative following the 
discussions with representatives from the CEOC in Uppsala -ho 
claimed that, even though an information system might bo nccde-j, 
it was not needed to support the decision making of the head of 
the CEOC. Instead, such a system would be mere useful to support. 
the work of the information department, which receives a qreat 
number of messages from the public, or the situation departr-^nt 
in its handling of radiation inforiaation. 
The subjects found the electronic form of cosnunication cold and 
impersonal. They felt that it led to a lor..; of ipf orr-ir inn. 
especially about the morale and rotate of mind of '„he J C P I T or 
of a message, iniormation that could b*» critical in a r^ -il 
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emergency. Hence, they did not think that electronic mail should 
replace other forms of communication in emergency management. 
The subjects missed the status reports that they would ordinarily 
have from the other staff members, and thus felt a lack of 
feedback concerning whether their decisions had been implemented. 
One subject in the off-site evaluation decided to do something 
about this, and called the experimenters to regular staff 
conferences every hour, where they had to play the role of the 
ordinary staff members and report on the extent to which various 
decisions had been implemented. This could have been included in 
the scenarios. Howe/er, all interaction among different parts of 
the organisation was deliberately excluded. The scenarios focused 
upon the decision making function, not the management of the 
organisation. This, of course, led to less realism, but then the 
purpose of the evaluation was not full scale realism, but 
evaluation of selected functions, with scenarios that made these 
functions important. 
The subjects from the county emergency organisation expressed a 
wish to have available some form of the system in their 
organisation. Moreover, subjects in both evaluations thought that 
the system would be very useful for training decision makers in 
the emergency organisation, something that is now only possible 
ir. expensive full scale drills. The prospects for a training 
system are now being evaluated by the Swedish Rescue Services 
Board. 
The fact that no positive effects of the information system could 
be detected in the present evaluation does, of course, not mean 
that such system would not prove effective under different 
conditions, especially in the off-site organisation. It may be 
true that under most (but perhaps not all) kinds of emergencies, 
the head of the CEOC does not have to handle enough detailed 
information with respect to the emergency situation to warrant a 
system of the kind developed here. There are, however, parts of 
the emergency organisation that experience considerable 
information loads, notably the status department and the 
information department. Specialised systems for these parts of 
the organisation may well prove to have positive effects on 
organisational performance. Moreover, there are situations when 
systems of the present kind may well prove beneficial, e.g., when 
56 
there is a change of personnel, and when the new head of some 
department of the organisation needs to assess the situation. 
Another situation when the systems may prove useful is when the 
emergency goes on for a very long time, and when there may be 
need to go back to old messages to assess the situation. Thus, 
there are a number of additional scenarios that should be tried 
before we draw any more definite conclusions about the usefulness 
of information systems for emergency management. However, time 
constraints made it impossible to test the system also under 
these conditions. The positive reactions from the personnel from 
the Uppsala county emergency organisation suggest that further 
tests may well be worthwhile. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
The project started out to find ways of using modern information 
technology to support emergency management in general. Based on 
the Chernobyl accident in 1986 the scope was restricted towards 
the nuclear industry. However, lessons could be learned for 
emergency systems in other industries as well, especially in 
emergency management related to the environments of process 
industries. 
In the project it was demonstrated that information systems -
especially devel-_>ed for emergency management - can be compu-
terised with the following advantages: 
- simplified access to the procedures in the preparedness plan, 
- automatic logging and time tagging of actions thereby relieving 
the production of status reports, 
- standardised procedures in message handling to ensure that 
nothing is forgotten, 
- categorisation, automatic time tagging, and filing of messages 
to facilitate later access to and use of these messages. 
The conceptual work was directed at analysing the general 
problems of emergency management for the unfamiliar forms of 
accidents that may be caused by modern technology, emergencies 
for which there is no relevant prior experience. 
Concerning emergency management in general in process industry 
the best choice for a decision support system will depend on the 
requirements of the expected situation. Elements from distributed 
decision making will be useful from the point of view of fast 
performance, whereas hierarchical systems will be useful if 
handling of different time scales or spatial scales is important. 
However, distributed decision making as well as hierarchical 
systems suffer from limitations as a general organisation for 
management of unknown emergencies. 
The analysis of nuclear accidents shows that we may not know all 
the ways in which they may arise, but we know much about how they 
will develop and what needs to be done, especially by the off-
site organisation. Therefore, in situations where precursors may 
be defined, it seems from the present analysis as if the most 
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effective way of coping with nuclear emergency situations is to 
consider emergency management as a control system using feed-
forward control. 
The information system developed in this project has been 
evaluation by running live experiments using the prototype 
systems and comparing with control experiments. Since only part 
of a decision support system was implemented, it is very 
difficult to draw general conclusions, even if only functional 
evaluation is considered. 
To demonstrate the improved performance of the system, we ought 
to test emergency management using the implemented functions on 
emergency situations being so challenging that the normal 
procedures would show decreased performance. The scenarios 
designed in the project were not sufficiently challenging. In all 
the control experiments the end result was complete control of 
the emergency situation leaving only limited space for showing 
improved performance by use of the new system. Though, the 
excellent performance by the test subjects in the control 
experiments is not surprising since they were professional 
persons, equipped with the tools they normally use when handling 
similar situations. 
It is remarkable that after only half an hour of introduction, 
performance with the new system is as efficient as the familiar 
way of coping with such problems. This indicates that with the 
subjects being somewhat more familiar with the computerised 
system, the system will contain a potential for increased 
performance. 
Additionally, even though the advantage of storing and being 
reminded of unread messages was not mentioned directly by the 
subjects, it seems from the experiments as if this function 
improved the control of the working conditions. 
Furthermore, user satisfaction and the request to have a form of 
the system for training are other indications of the value of the 
system. 
An important lesson to be learned from the project is that 
extreme care is needed in the analysing phase when test set-ups 
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are selected. As the system has been developed to support ighly 
loaded and stressing communication, it would have been more 
worthwhile to support the information department of the County 
Emergency Centre with the new system instead of trying it out on 
the head of such organisation. This has also been pointed out by 
some of the subjects. 
Likewise, the system ought to be tested on a person normally 
working alone - as it has been developed for that kind of 
situation - rather than trying it out on a person normally 
working in a team of persons as is the case for the Plant 
Emergency Manager. 
Besides, it could have been interesting to run experiments using 
test subjects less familiar with specific emergency situations to 
try out if the system could support that category of operators to 
obtain an improved performance instead of using experts as we 
did. 
Unfortunately, new tests concerning the modifications mentioned 
above were not performed due to the limited time available for 
the project. 
However, the results indicate that modern information technology 
may improve the survey of an emergency situation, which again may 
improve performance, especially in the extremely rare situations, 
which we know by experience will show up in the nuclear as well 
as in the process industry. 
Based on the results of this project it has been decided to 
continue along the same lines, and the work is now carried on in 
an ESPRIT project, where a complete demonstration will be 
possible. 
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